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It follows, moreover, from this account that theoretical terms have no significance apart from the theory in which they are imbedded. For it is the theory, after all, that informs us that it is electrons (not tiny pebbles) that reveal their presence in cathode ray tubes and cloud chambers. It is the lawlike connections which the theory asserts to hold between electrons, other theoretical entities, and observables which provides the basis for the partial interpretation of the term 'electron' (and the theory's other theoretical terms as well). This is sometimes put succinctly by saying that the theoretical terms are implicitly defined by the nomological network (the system of lawlike statements) in which they are imbedded. The theoretical terms acquire their empirical content by 'upward seepage' or 'osmosis' (Herbert Feigl's phrases) from the observation terms (cf. [31, PP. 34-36; [5] , p. 87; and [6] , pp. 46-52). Before examining this view in more detail, let us state matters somewhat more precisely.
Following Carnap [I] , let the primitive terms of the theory be divided into two classes: the theoretical terms and the observation terms.1 Let the language in which the theory is formulated be first-order, and the theory be given by a finite set of axioms. The interpretation of the primitive observation terms is assumed completely specified, perhaps given ostensively, or in some other fairly 'direct' way. Now the axioms of the theory can be said to preclude certain interpretations for the theoretical terms, namely those which make the theory false. Thus, the axioms restrict the set of all possible interpretations of theoretical terms to a much narrower set-the set of true interpretations-and this, I think, is a fairly accurate explication of what is sometimes meant by saying that the axioms 'implicitly' define these terms (certainly by Nagel [5] , p. 87 and Pap [6] , pp.
51-52).
Were it not for the assumption that the observation terms have a fixed empirical interpretation, this would be a patently inadequate account of the empirical significance of theoretical terms. For since we have assumed our theory couched in the language of quantification theory, Lowenheim's theorem assures us of the existence of a true arithmetical interpretation of the theory if the theory be satisfiable at all. Once we assume a fixed empirical interpretation for the observation predicates, however, Lowenheim's result no longer applies. But, even though Lowenheim's theorem cannot be used in this instance, can we arrive at numerical interpretations of theoretical terms via another route? The following considerations would seem to indicate a negative answer to this question. First, any adequate reconstruction of a physical theory will contain sentences (called by Carnap and others, 'correspondence postulates') which contain both theoretical and observation terms. Any admissible interpretation of the theory's theoretical terms, then, must be such as to make these sentences come out true while retaining a fixed interpretation for the observation terms. But then the correspondence rules would truly assert connections between classes of theoretical entities and classes of observational entitiesseemingly an impossible situation if theoretical entities are taken to be numbers. Furthermore, the theory may contain relation symbols which, under their intended interpretations, again relate theoretical and observational entities. So we would seem to have some assurance that true numerical interpretations for theoretical terms are not generally forthcoming. The theory's correspondence rules, in particular, would seem to weave an empirical web about the theoretical terms, guaranteeing that they designate classes of physical entities-not numbers. But if the result to be presented here is correct, then, under certain trivial assumptions, a true numerical interpretation for the theoretical terms will always be forthcoming (if there exists a true physical interpretation). Furthermore, the interpretation of the observation terms is not affected as the theoretical terms are now construed as designating classes of numbers. In short, the fact that an empirical interpretation of the observation terms is taken as fixed, does not rule out true numerical interpretations for the theoretical terms. As far as the doctrine of implicit definition goes, theoretical entities might just as well be construed as numbers. In the next section, this and a related result will be stated with proofs sketched.
II
Let the language L5 in which our theory " is formulated be first-order and contain, for simplicity's sake, a finite number of predicates as the only descriptive signs. These predicates are divided into three classes: As will become clear later, these are the observation terms, theoretical terms, and 'mixed' terms, respectively. Rather than formulating Y-in a two-sorted language, we shall also introduce the one-place predicates 'Th' and 'Ob' which, intuitively, are read as 'is a theoretical entity' and 'is an observational entity', respectively. A possible model for But if all this be granted, and one is sympathetic to the realist account of scientific theories, there must be something amiss somewhere. One possibility is to require that the theoretical entities be restricted to entities which are in space-time, thus ruling out numbers as possible candidates. But if we are not to abandon the notion of the implicit definition of theoretical terms altogether, then this is no significant restriction on theoretical entities at all. For to say that a set of entities are in space-time would merely amount to asserting that the set satisfies the geometrical axioms of our theory, and it follows from Th. 2 that a suitable class of numbers will do this for any set of axioms.
There is, I think, a more plausible reason which might be given as an explanation for the result given here. Theoretical entities are certainly considered as having causal connections with observational entities. Now the language ' in which the theory was formulated was assumed to be extensional,1 and perhaps our result again gives evidence to the claim that an extensional language ? cannot 'capture' the sense of a causal connection. This contention is impossible to evaluate with any assurance, however, until a plausible and systematic account of the causal modalities appears.2
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